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Using empirical data from over 1500 respondents (drawn from across the UK) to a
survey on academic freedom, and the Times Higher’s World University Rankings, this
paper is a comparative assessment of the relationship between professed levels of de
facto protection for academic freedom by teaching and research staff in individual UK
universities, and their institution’s excellence, as evinced by world university rankings.
The study reveals that normative protection for academic freedom is strongest in Russell
Group universities and weakest in post-1992 institutions. Additionally, the professed
level of protection for academic freedom reported by respondents to the survey is shown
to have a positive relationship with the World Rankings’ positions of their institutions.
Furthermore, the study considers whether academic freedom may be a prerequisite for,
or defining characteristic of, a world-class university. Finally, the paper assesses the
possible policy implications of this research for universities and their leaders, and
higher educational policy makers, within the UK and beyond, seeking to improve the
Times Higher’s World Ranking positions of their institutions.
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Introduction: The Rise of Rankings
For more than 20 years, university rankings (measuring the achievements of higher
education institutions in terms of research, student satisfaction, teaching excel-
lence, etc.) have been an integral part of the higher education firmament in the UK
and, increasingly, across the globe. The first university league table produced in the
UK appeared in The Times in October 1992, and since then international university
rankings have proliferated in terms of provider, scope and number. Indeed, Shin
and Toutkoushian (2011, 2) reported ‘we found that as of 2009, there were at least
33 ranking systems of higher education around the world’, and the number has
increased since. For example, the Times Higher, in addition to providing the World
University Rankings (since 2004), also offers Asia University Rankings, BRICS &
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Emerging Economies University Rankings, US College Rankings, Latin America
University Rankings and the Top 150 Universities Under 50-years-old Rankings. In
consequence, in recent years, rankings have become widely discussed, not only at
High Table and within academic cloisters, but also in national governments and in
the media, and by aspiring university students and their anxious parents. The
general surge in the interest of such rankings has been such that universities have
found it increasingly necessary to demonstrate that they are improving their
performance, by ‘moving up the rankings’. Thus, government departments, Rectors
and academics alike, in turn either loath or love these statistics, negating the
validity of such measures (when their universities have low rankings) or praising
their value in improving transparency and accountability (when their universities
have high rankings). This fixation has led Marginson (2007, 2) to argue that
‘[r]ankings are the meta-performance indicator, with a special power of their own.
Rankings are hypnotic and become an end in themselves without regard to exactly
what they measure, whether they are solidly grounded or whether their use has
constructive effects. The desire for rank ordering overrules all else’.
Indeed, such is the desire by national governments to have institutions that
occupy premier places in the Times Higher’s (and similar) World University
Rankings, that some have taken special measures designed to achieve this goal. For
example, in 2007, the Finnish government decided to merge Helsinki University of
Technology, Helsinki School of Economics and the University of Art and Design
with, as Aarrevaara et al. (2009, 10) state, ‘the unashamed aim of creating a
‘‘world-class’’ university’, and injected 500 million Euros as an initial investment.
However, the Times Higher’s 2016–2017 World Rankings revealed that the new
Aalto University (named after the famous Finnish architect) was ranked in the
201–250 group cohort (as it was in the previous year), some 100 places below
Helsinki University, whose position it was designed to emulate, if not surpass.
Similarly in China, Zang et al. (2013, 767) reported that in 1998, the (then) Chinese
President Jiang Zemin declared that ‘China must have a number of first-rate
universities with an advanced level internationally’, following which the Chinese
government published its Action Plan for Invigorating Education in the 21st
Century, which formalised the goal of developing ‘world-class’ universities and
departments.
Not surprisingly, university rankings have been criticised, within academia and
beyond, for the use to which they have been put, and their mode of calculation. For
example, addressing the apparent shortcomings of such rankings, Amsler and
Bolsmann (2012, 294) aver: ‘[t]here is little doubt that most ranking schemes
indicate precisely what they claim to: where elite people are funded by elite people
to teach elite people knowledge for elites. What university rankings do not indicate,
however, is where and how education functions as a practice of freedom for the
excluded majority’. Similarly, noting the dominance of American universities in
most rankings, Pusser and Marginson (2013, 562f.) argue that ‘rankings are seen to
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embody a meta-state project – an imperial project (that is, a project embodying the
interests of the globally strongest states) in which institutions are being slotted into
a preordained global hierarchy’, and pose the question which is germane to this
paper, namely: ‘what are the short-term and long-term implications of rankings for
academic freedom and creativity, and do these effects play out differently between
leading universities (where academic freedom might be seen as one instrument
fostering a high rank but on the limited terms of the ranking criteria) and other
institutions?’
With respect to the statistical validity of the calculation of such indices, as Salmi
and Saroyan (2007, 42) show:
‘Opponents question every element of the rankings, from the very principle of
participating in an exercise seen as a typical product of an ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’
culture obsessed with competitiveness or as an intolerable infringement on the
universities’ independence, to a systematic criticism of flawed methodologies,
including the conceptual design of the surveys, the choice of indicators, the
relative weight attached to each indicator and the data bases on which the
rankings are done. The results are often dismissed as irrelevant or wrong’.
Harvey (2008, 189), for example, despite providing no form of detailed statistical
critique by way of substantiation, nevertheless dismissed such rankings as
‘arbitrary, inconsistent and based on convenience measures’. In a like vein, but
more helpfully, Bowden (2000, 52) listed the following methodological challenges
which had been made concerning the calculation of such rankings: the technical
status of some of the variables used; inadequate construct validity; the scaling of
variables; changes in variables, and in their respective weighting, from year to year;
manipulation of data; vulnerability to perturbation; lack of correspondence between
the overall rating or ranking and the quality of individual academic units; and
distortion of institutional purpose. Such an appraisal finds endorsement in Soh’s
comprehensive statistical analysis which revealed that ‘world university ranking
systems used the weight-and-sum approach to combine indicator scores into overall
scores…. This approach assumes that the indicators all independently contribute to
the overall score in the specified proportions. … this assumption is doubtful as the
indicators tend to correlate with one another and some highly’ (Soh, 2015, 158).
Soh’s findings corroborate previous tests of the statistical validity of university
rankings as composite measures by Paruolo et al. (2013, 630), who concluded that
they ‘have serious shortcomings.… Still these measures are pervasive in the public
discourse and represent perhaps the best-known face of statistics in the eyes of the
general public and media’.
Inevitably, the proliferation of university rankings, and the criticisms raised
about their validity, led to demands for greater consistency. In consequence, in
2004 the UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education founded the
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International Ranking Expert Group, which produced the 2006 Berlin Principles on
Ranking of Higher Education Institutions, which were designed to promote
continuous improvement and refinement of the methodologies used to calculate
rankings. Despite criticisms of the Berlin Principles (see Barron, 2017), such
developments encouraged those institutions compiling rankings to improve their
scope, sophistication and mode of calculation, and adopt a more transparent
approach. Indeed, Baty (2014, 126), reviewing improvements in the Times Higher’s
World University Rankings for the period 2004–2012, acknowledged that ‘[i]n
retrospect, the old THES-QS system now looks hopelessly crude by today’s
standards’. In consequence, as Moed (2017, 986) points out, ‘[d]evelopers of world
university ranking systems have made enormous progress during the past decade.
Their systems are currently much more informative and user friendly than they
were some 10 years ago’. Such developments do much to endorse Rauhvargers
(2013, 26) prognosis that ‘[r]ankings are here to stay. Even if academics are aware
that the results of rankings are biased and cannot satisfactorily measure institutional
quality, on a more pragmatic level they also recognise that an impressive position
in the rankings can be a key factor in securing additional resources, recruiting more
students and attracting strong partner institutions’.
Academic Freedom as an Indicator of Excellence
Attempts at analysing academic freedom encounter a surprising, yet formidable,
problem, namely that the concept (despite its apparent importance to universities
and the academics who work in them) lacks clarity of definition and a strong
theoretical basis. For example, A˚kerlind and Kayrooz’s (2003, 328) opine that
‘[d]espite the wide ranging debate about academic freedom in recent times, there is
little consensus between parties as to what academic freedom actually means. …
the concept is open to a range of interpretations and has been used at times to
support conflicting causes and positions’. Similarly, Latif (2014, 399) notes ‘the
lack of a clear definition of academic freedom … academic freedom seems to be a
vague term with no defining characteristics’. In a like vein, Altbach (2001, 206)
relates that ‘[a]cademic freedom seems a simple concept, and in essence it is, but it
is also difficult to define’. This is a long-standing problem – 20 years has elapsed
since Barnett (rightly) called for ‘a theory of academic freedom which does justice
to the actual relationship between higher education and society rather than an
imaginary relationship’ (Barnett, 1988, 90).
However, drawing on a series of definitive texts, such as the UNESCO (1997)
Recommendation on the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel, the
American Association of University Professors’ (AAUP) (1940) Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, and the Council of Europe (2012)
Academic Freedom Declaration, it is possible to identify the following commonly
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agreed substantive and supportive elements of the concept (for a more detailed
description of the salient features of the concept, see Karran, 2009). The
substantive elements are firstly, freedom to teach. This freedom will normally
include some (may be all) of the following. Freedom to determine: what shall be
taught (course content); how it shall be taught (pedagogy); who shall teach (via
transparent selection procedures); whom shall be taught (the right to determine and
enforce entry standards); how students’ progress shall be evaluated (assessment
methods); whether students shall progress (via marking criteria and grade
determination). Secondly, freedom to research and, as with teaching, this element
has associated liberties which will include freedom to determine: what shall be
researched; the method of research; the purpose of their research (and, thereby,
possible refusal to undertake research considered unethical); the avenues and
modes (conference presentations, journal articles) of disseminating research
findings to one’s peers, and the wider world. The extent to which these liberties
are enjoyed by academic staff is dependent on the interpretation of the de jure
(legal and constitutional) protection and the operation of de facto (normative)
protection; within the UK, the interplay of these can give rise to considerable
variation in the freedoms enjoyed by individual staff.
These two substantive elements are buttressed and sustained by two supportive
elements: self-governance and tenure. Self-governance consists of the rights to: voice
an opinion on the running of the university; participate in decision-making within the
university; be able to appoint people to, and dismiss them from, positions of managerial
authority within the university. Tenure comprises the right to some form of job security
within the university, via an agreed procedure involving a peer-reviewed assessment of
academic accomplishments, following the successful completion of a probationary
period of employment. However, university tenure was abolished in the UK by the
1988 Education Reform Act and although there may be some staff who were awarded
tenure before the act, they are likely to be very small in number.
There is a further enabling element that warrants consideration within the UK
context, that of autonomy. Individual autonomy and institutional autonomy are
often conflated under the heading of ‘academic freedom’. Indeed, Rabban (2001,
17) has noted that academic freedom has been used to refer to ‘both the freedom of
the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the government… and the
freedom of the individual teacher (or in some versions – indeed in most cases – the
student)’. Although these two concepts are linked, they are different. Wolff’s study
makes this distinction explicit, viz. ‘academic freedom is the privilege individual
academics may claim as the freedom to question and test received wisdom, to put
forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing
themselves in jeopardy of losing the jobs or privileges they may have at their
institutions. Academic autonomy applies to the institution. It may be defined as the
right of academic institutions to decide freely and independently how to perform
their tasks’ (Wolff, 2000, 198).
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Academic freedom for teaching and learning, and its supportive elements of
autonomy, shared governance and tenure, is not utilised in the compilation of
university rankings tables. To those conversant with the concept, such an omission
might be surprising, for the following reasons. First, academic freedom is considered
to be a defining characteristic of the quality of universities – hence Manan (2000,
255) declaims that ‘[a]cademic freedom is a precondition for academic excellence’.
Supportive justifications for academic freedom as an essential prerequisite for
institutional excellence and world-class status come from past Presidents of
universities considered globally pre-eminent in terms of their research and teaching.
For example, Kingman Brewster, President of Yale from 1963 to 1977 (and later
Master of University College, Oxford) asserted that: ‘academic freedom within the
university has a value which goes beyond protecting the individual’s broad scope of
thought and enquiry. It bears crucially upon the distinctive quality of the university as
a community’ (1972, 382). Additionally, research into the characteristics of world-
class universities undertaken by Altbach (2011, 16) conceded that ‘[w]ithout
academic freedom, a research university cannot fulfill its mission, nor can it be a
world-class university’ (original author’s emphasis), while Rosovsky (2014, 58)
found that ‘all the institutions at the top of the American educational pyramid share
six characteristics closely associated with high quality’, two of which were shared
governance and academic freedom for research and teaching.
Secondly, on close examination, individual universities known to possess
unquestioned research and scholastic excellence tend to overtly embrace academic
freedom, such that it becomes a distinctive hallmark of the ethos of these
institutions. For example, Oxford currently occupies the first place in the Times
Higher’s World University Rankings Table. Oxford explicitly recognises the
importance of academic freedom in its current Mission Statement, viz.: ‘the value
we accord to the principle of academic freedom, enabling the pursuit of academic
enquiry subject to the norms and standards of scholarly undertaking, without
interference or penalty. This freedom to seek out truth and understanding, whether
through theoretical or empirical means, will ensure that our strong core disciplines
flourish’ (University of Oxford, 2013, 5). Similarly, Harvard University, which is
invariably ranked in the top 5 in the Times Higher and other comparable world
university rankings, has a Statement on Rights and Responsibilities which
proclaims that ‘freedom of speech and academic freedom, freedom from personal
force and violence, and freedom of movement’ are essential to its nature as an
academic community, such that ‘[i]nterference with any of these freedoms must be
regarded as a serious violation of the personal rights upon which the community is
based’ (University of Harvard, 1970). Harvard has two governing bodies, the Board
of Overseers and the Corporation. The Board of Overseers has 30 members, all
drawn from, and elected by, Harvard alumni for a six-year term. The Corporation
comprises twelve members, six from the private sector, six from the public sector
(four have been Professors at other USA universities) and the President, all bar two
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of whom have Harvard degrees. In essence, Harvard is governed by its alumni. As
institutions like Oxford and Harvard demonstrate, academic freedom is both a
hallmark of, and a prerequisite for, research, scholastic and institutional excellence,
befitting a ‘world-class university’.
Measurements, Methods and Results
In order to assess whether high-ranked universities are more likely to protect
academic freedom, data were obtained from two sources. First, as part of work
commissioned by the University and College Union, an online survey on academic
freedom aimed at all UK academic staff teaching HE courses was created and
launched in December 2016, which resulted in 2239 responses from UCU members
working in UK universities. The analysis excluded private HE providers in the UK
which, although small in number, are growing in terms of student numbers. Given
that private for profit universities in the USA are frequently censured by the AAUP
for their failure to protect academic freedom, it would have been interesting to
compare the de facto protection for academic freedom in private HE providers with
that enjoyed by staff in publicly funded universities in the U.K. Clearly, future
analyses of academic freedom in the UK will need to take account of private
provision, if it continues to maintain its current growth. Second, data supplied by
the Times Higher from its World University Rankings (which include 981
universities) enabled the rank positions of UK publicly funded universities to be
calculated. On the basis of these rankings, the 91 eligible UK universities were
divided into five equally sized cohorts, although the uneven number of institutions
ranked meant that the last cohort had one more institution than the other four. The
UCU data were then examined, and all responses from staff in the eligible
institutions extracted. SPSS was used to calculate ANOVA and Chi-square (v2)
statistics to make comparisons between the cohorts with respect to the responses to
questions in the academic freedom survey. Following Salkind (2004), one-way
ANOVA tests were carried out to determine the F statistic and the statistical
significance of the difference between the means of the different ranked cohorts. In
line with standard statistical practice, the null hypothesis is accepted if there is no
statistical difference between the means of the groups, where p[ 0.05. The
decision to use a 5% (as opposed to a 1 or 10%) significance level is arbitrary, but
as Gall et al. (2007) and Cowles and Davis (1982) report, a 5% significance level is
invariably used in studies of this kind, and across the social sciences.
Additionally, where appropriate, the nonparametric v2 test was employed, as it
has an advantage over one-way ANOVA, in that whereas the one-way ANOVA is
based on the comparison of means between the two independent groups, v2
compares the actual counts within the categories with the expected data that would
be obtained according to a specific hypothesis (for a summary see, Onchiri, 2013).
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This test was appropriate to analyse categorical data which had been counted and
divided into categories according to the cohorts. Hence, the v2 test was used to
compare responses of the groups to individual questions, thereby determining
whether there exists a significant difference between them as categorical variables.
Table 1 shows the results obtained when respondents were asked to score the
level of protection for academic freedom within their institution on a scale of 1
(very low) to 9 (very high). As can be seen, there are stark differences between the
different cohorts. For example, 5.3% of respondents in Cohort 1 (containing the
universities with the highest Times Higher World University Rankings) rated the
protection for academic freedom in their institutions as very low. The comparable
figure for Cohort 5 (containing the universities with the lowest World University
Rankings) was 18.0%. At the other end of the scale, 5.3% of the respondents in
Cohort 1 rated the protection for academic freedom in their institutions as very
high, compared with only 0.9% with respect to the respondents in Cohort 5. Not
surprisingly, perhaps, the use of ANOVA reveals that these differences are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Calculating the mean scores reveals similar differences – the mean scale score
for Cohort 1 was 5.5 out of 9, i.e. above the central scale point, while that for the
Cohort 5 was 4.0, i.e. below the central scale point. Similarly, collapsing the nine-
point scale into three categories produces an enhanced picture of the difference
between the different cohorts, as shown in Table 2. Over a third of the respondents
in Cohort 5 believe that there is a below average level of protection for academic
freedom in their institutions, which is twice the figure (17.2%) for Cohort 1.
Table 1 What do you think is the level of protection for academic freedom in your institution?
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
1 = very low
level of protection
5.3 11.4 8.1 13.3 18.0
2 4.1 6.0 10.2 7.1 10.7
3 7.8 8.5 10.2 12.0 8.2
4 8.2 10.9 10.2 8.3 11.2
5 = average level
of protection
25.5 32.4 34.9 31.1 33.5
6 12.3 9.4 10.8 8.7 8.2
7 16.2 14.0 6.5 10.4 5.6
8 15.2 5.1 6.5 6.6 3.9
9 = very high
level of protection
5.3 2.4 2.7 2.5 0.9
All (n = 1561) 100 (n = 487) 100 (n = 414) 100 (n = 186) 100 (n = 241) 100 (n = 233)
N.B. % figures may not sum to 100% owing to rounding
One-way ANOVA: F = 25.458 4 df significant at 1% level
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Conversely, the proportion of respondents in Cohort 1 who consider the level of
protection in their institutions to be generally high (36.8%) is more than three times
that of their counterparts in Cohort 5 (10.3%). The calculation of the v2 value for
the aggregated raw data for these collapsed categories shows these differences
between the different cohorts to be significant at the 1% level.
To examine the situation in greater depth, respondents were asked to reflect
whether the protection for academic freedom at their institution and department had
risen, fallen or remained constant in recent years. The results are shown in Table 3.
Summing across all cohorts reveals that one-third of respondents were unable to
say, or did not know, whether the protection for academic freedom had changed
(34.0%). Similarly, more than half (52.9%) of all respondents thought that the
protection for academic freedom had diminished or greatly diminished, while only
1% thought that that protection for academic freedom had increased or greatly
increased. The differences between the cohorts were statistically significant at the
1% level (v2 = 45.665), although the picture was mixed – 14.5% of respondents in
Cohort 1 believed that protection had greatly diminished, compared with 25.4% of
those in Cohort 5; however, 33.9% of those in Cohort 1 thought that academic
freedom had diminished, compared with 25.0% in Cohort 5. Respondents in the
higher-ranked cohorts were also more likely to think that the level of protection had
remained unchanged. Overall, staff in institutions occupying the highest ranks of
the Times Higher’s World University Rankings were more likely to report a higher
level of protection and a lower level of decline for academic freedom than those
institutions in the lowest rankings.
Having considered opinions on the general protection for academic freedom, the
individual elements of academic freedom for teaching and research will now be
examined. Table 4 details responses that participants gave to the statement
Table 2 Level of protection for academic freedom in respondents’ institutions: collapsed categories
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Categories 1–3 17.2 25.8 28.5 32.4 36.9
Generally low
level of protection
Categories 4–6 46.0 52.7 55.9 48.1 52.8
Average level of
protection
Categories 7 to 9 36.8 21.5 15.6 19.5 10.3
Generally high
level of protection
All (n = 1561) 100 (n = 487) 100 (n = 414) 100 (n = 186) 100 (n = 241) 100 (n = 233)
v2 = 93.769, 8 df [C.V. 5% = 15.5070], p\ 0.001, Crame´r’s V = 0.173.
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‘academic freedom for research has declined in recent years’. As can be seen, the
v2 statistic demonstrates, once again, a statistically significant difference between
the different cohorts at the 1% level. In this instance, 40.4% of staff from Cohort 1
agreed/strongly agreed with this statement, as opposed to 48.7% of staff from
Cohort 5; at the other end of the scale, 18.5% of Cohort 1 staff disagreed/strongly
disagreed, with this statement, the comparable figure for Cohort 5 being 7.4%.
With respect to university research policy in the UK, the major change in the last
40 years has been the introduction of the national periodic evaluations of research
(Research Assessment Exercises in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2008, and the
Research Excellence Framework in 2014), under which the quality of research is
evaluated, and the rankings used to allocate research funding. Table 5 provides a
breakdown of responses to the statement ‘the Research Excellence Framework has
Table 3 How has the protection for academic freedom changed in your institution?
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Greatly
diminished
14.5 21.7 24.3 25.8 25.4
Diminished 33.9 34.3 32.8 29.9 25.0
Remained
unchanged
16.2 12.3 10.6 7.8 9.3
Increased 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.0
Greatly increased 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.0
I don’t
know/cannot say
34.6 30.7 30.7 34.8 40.3
All (n = 1572) 100 (n = 489) 100 (n = 414) 100 (n = 189) 100 (n = 244) 100 (n = 236)
v2 = 45.665, 16 df [C.V. 5% = 26.296], p\ 0.001, Crame´r’s V = 0.085.
Table 4 Academic freedom for research has declined in recent years
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Strongly agree 13.0 16,5 20.1 19.2 21.1
Agree 27.4 35.5 28.6 24.7 27.6
Neither agree or
disagree
41.0 35.8 37.6 43.9 44.0
Disagree 14.0 9.5 9.5 10.0 6.6
Disagree strongly 4.5 2.7 4.2 2.1 0.9
All (n = 1562) 100 (n = 485) 100 (n = 411) 100 (n = 189) 100 (n = 239) 100 (n = 232)
v2 = 39.565, 16 df [C.V. 5% = 26.296], p\ 0.001, Crame´r’s V = 0.080.
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diminished my academic freedom for research’ and reveals a statistically
significant difference between the different cohorts at the 5% level. The majority
(57.3%) of respondents across all cohorts agreed/strongly agreed that the Research
Excellence Framework exercise had diminished their academic freedom, and
although over 30% were undecided as to its effect, only 12.3% thought that the
REF had not adversely affected their academic freedom. Staff in universities in the
lower-ranked cohorts were more likely to perceive that these evaluation exercises
had limited their academic freedom for research. Hence, 60.3% of staff in Cohort 5
(with the lowest Times Higher’s World Rankings) agreed/strongly agreed that the
Research Excellence Framework had diminished their academic freedom,
compared with 52.9% of respondents in Cohort 1 (with the highest rankings).
Similarly, 16.8% of staff in Cohort 1 disagreed/strongly disagreed that the Research
Excellence Framework had diminished their academic freedom, which was more
than twice the comparable figure (7.6%) for staff in Cohort 5. In sum, staff in the
highest ranked universities are less likely to report that their academic freedom for
research has declined and that this freedom has been adversely affected by the
national evaluation of university research.
The impact of this periodic process of research evaluation on academic freedom
has been debated widely within academia and beyond. Murphy and Sage (2015,
36), for example, report that ‘[t]he discussions around the REF… have tended to be
negatively skewed …. Our analysis here suggests that many academics have
genuine concerns about the implications of the REF affecting their morale, their
sense of their role and, potentially, their employment within the sector.’ Its impact
on academic freedom has been more difficult to judge, with some, like Nolan et al.
(2008), posing the question: ‘The Research Excellence Framework (REF): A major
impediment to free and informed debate?’, and subsequently urging staff to
distance themselves from the process. Other scholars, like Smith et al. (2011,
1369), have identified ‘threats to academic autonomy implied in the definition of
Table 5 Research excellence framework has diminished my academic freedom for research
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Strongly agree 26.0 31.3 33.3 33.1 32.9
Agree 26.3 26.7 28.0 26.0 27.4
Neither agree or
disagree
30.3 28.9 29.0 32.2 32.1
Disagree 11.6 10.2 9.1 7.9 6.8
Disagree strongly 5.2 2.9 0.5 0.8 0.8
All (n = 1559) 100 (n = 482) 100 (n = 412) 100 (n = 186) 100 (n = 242) 100 (n = 237)
v2 = 30.665, 16 df [C.V. 5% = 26.296], p\ 0.05, Crame´r’s V = 0.70.
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expert review and the delimitation of reviewers, … and the framing of knowledge
translation by the stipulation that impact ‘‘builds on’’ research’. Similarly,
endorsing the findings of this paper, Watermeyer’s assessment concluded that the
REF ‘is viewed by academics as an infringement to a scholarly way of life; as
symptomatic of the marketisation of higher education; and as fundamentally
incompatible and deleterious to the production of new knowledge’ (2016, 199). The
impact of the REF is problematic to assess, but it would be difficult to argue it has
strengthened academic freedom.
The other main element of academic freedom relates to teaching, and Table 6
details responses that participants gave to the statement ‘academic freedom for
teaching in my institution has declined in recent years’. As can be seen, the v2
statistic demonstrates, once again, a statistically significant difference (at the l %
level) between the different cohorts. In this instance, 37.2% of academic staff from
Cohort 1 agreed/strongly agreed that academic freedom for teaching had declined,
as opposed to virtually half (49.8%) of staff from Cohort 5; at the other end of the
scale, 21.1% of Cohort 1 staff disagreed/strongly disagreed, with this statement, the
comparable figure for Cohort 5 being 6.4%, with less than one respondent in 100
among this cohort strongly disagreeing that academic freedom for teaching has
declined. Comparison of the Crame´r’s V statistics in Tables 4 and 6 reveals that the
differences between the cohorts are greater with respect to teaching (Crame´r’s V =
0.089) than research (Crame´r’s V = 0.080).
Following on from the Research Excellence Framework, in 2017 the UK
government introduced a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) with the goal of
assessing the quality of undergraduate teaching, under which participating
institutions were allowed to increase their tuition fees, in line with inflation, if
they passed a baseline quality standard. Table 7 provides a summary of the
responses that participants gave to the statement ‘the Teaching Excellence
Framework will diminish my academic freedom for teaching’. As can be seen,
although the respondents from the highest ranked cohort are less likely (66.9%) to
Table 6 Academic freedom for teaching has declined in recent years
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Strongly agree 11.2 12.8 13.4 16.5 18.3
Agree 26.0 28.3 34.8 28.1 31.5
Neither agree or
disagree
41.7 44.7 33.2 45.0 43.8
Disagree 15.9 12.1 13.4 8.7 5.5
Disagree strongly 5.2 2.2 5.3 1.7 0.9
All (n = 1562) 100 (n = 484) 100 (n = 414) 100 (n = 187) 100 (n = 242) 100 (n = 235)
v2 = 49.408, 16 df [C.V. 5% = 29.296], p\ 0.001, Crame´r’s V = 0.089.
Terence Karran and Lucy Mallinson
Academic Freedom and World-Class Universities: A Virtuous Circle?
Higher Education Policy 2018
strongly agree/agree that the TEF will diminish their academic freedom than the
staff in the lowest ranked cohort (76.7%), these differences are not statistically
significant at the 5% level. Hence, overall, staff in the highest ranked universities
are less likely to report that their academic freedom for teaching has declined and
that this freedom will be diminished by the introduction of the TEF. However,
across all cohorts, 70.6% agreed/strongly agreed that the new TEF would diminish
their academic freedom, while only 6.0% disagreed/strongly disagreed. This
universal condemnatory perception may be a reflection of suspicion, rather than
experience, and it may turn out that the impact of the TEF on academic freedom is
less corrosive than the respondents’ fear it will be. According to the Green Paper
which preceded the TEF, an avowed intention of the reform was ‘protect the
institutional autonomy and academic freedom that has underpinned the success of
English higher education’ (DBIS, 2015, 58). However, unlike the REF, which has
been in place for the 30 years, the long-term impact of the new TEF on academic
freedom has yet to be ascertained, although academic publications in advance of
the reform were generally critical. Frankham (2017), for example, refers to ‘the
follies of the ‘‘Productivity Challenge’’ in the Teaching Excellence Framework’,
while Wood and Su’s empirical study of academics’ perspectives of the concept of
‘teaching excellence’ in higher education concluded that teaching excellence was
‘a complex concept with many layers of meaning and not easily captured by
metrics’ and found that ‘[t]he potential for polarisation of teaching and research
through a separate TEF and a REF is concerning’ (Wood and Su, 2017, 463).
Discussion
The results reveal that staff in UK universities occupying high positions in the
Times Higher’s World University Rankings report higher levels of protection for
academic freedom in their institutions and lower diminishment of their academic
Table 7 Teaching Excellence Framework will diminish my academic freedom
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Strongly agree 37.6 39.9 45.2 45.7 42.8
Agree 29.3 26.8 27.1 31.3 33.9
Neither agree or
disagree
26.0 26.0 22.9 18.5 19.5
Disagree 5.4 6.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Disagree strongly 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.2 0.4
All (n = 1562) 100 (n = 484) 100 (n = 411) 100 (n = 188) 100 (n = 243) 100 (n = 236)
v2 = 20.630, 16 df [C.V. 5% = 29.296], not significant, Crame´r’s V = 0.057.
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freedom generally, and also specifically with respect to academic freedom for both
teaching and research, when compared with staff in universities occupying lower
positions in the rankings. Additionally, staff in the higher-ranked institutions are
less likely to ascribe reductions in the academic freedom to the government’s
national quality evaluations of university research and teaching.
In the top 200 universities listed in the 2017 Times Higher World rankings
(https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-
ranking), there are 32 universities from the UK; all (bar one) members of the
Russell Group (which is widely perceived as representing the best universities in
the country) appear in this cohort, while there are no entrants from among the UK’s
post-1992 (ex-polytechnic) universities – the highest ranked post-1992 institution is
Anglia Ruskin University, which is in the 301–350 group. Table 8 shows the
distribution of Russell Group, pre- and post-1992 universities, in accordance with
their placement within five Times Higher’s World University Rankings cohorts,
from the highest to the lowest. As can be seen, the Russell Group institutions
dominate the cohort with the highest rankings which, as this study has shown, are
more likely to provide stronger protection for academic freedom. Cohorts 2 and 3
largely comprise the other pre-1992 universities, while most of the institutions in
the lowest ranked Cohorts 4 and 5 (in which levels of, and protection for, academic
freedom were relatively low) are post-1992 universities.
These differences are, perhaps, surprising, given that it is now 25 years since the
polytechnics were granted university status and that, in many respects, the UK
higher education sector is relatively homogenous. Hence, the pre- and post-1992
institutions are very similar in terms of: the awards they provide (at EQF Levels 6,
7 and 8); their structures of faculties and departments; the portfolios of courses they
offer (although post-1992 universities are less likely to provide courses in the
STEM subjects and medicine); the manner in which they teach (lectures and
seminars); and the fees they charge to students. Moreover, in some cities (e.g.
Leeds, London, Manchester) pre- and post-1992 institutions are often in close
physical proximity and may share student support facilities, for example, the Leeds
Table 8 Times Higher World University Rankings and Russell Group, Pre- and Post-1992 Universi-
ties’ Cohorts
Response Highest Times Higher World University Ranking Lowest
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Russell group 94.4 38.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other pre-1992 universities 5.6 61.1 83.3 27.8 10.5
Post-1992 universities 0.0 0.0 16.7 72.2 89.5
All (91) 100 (n = 18) 100 (n = 18) 100 (n = 18) 100 (n = 18) 100 (n = 19)
v2 = 92.825, 8 df [C.V. 5% = 15.507], p\ 0.001, Crame´r’s V = 0.761.
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Student Medical Practice serves students from both Leeds and Leeds Beckett
Universities. One major difference, however, between these two institutional types
is their mode of governance, which has ramifications for academic freedom.
The vast majority of the pre-1992 institutions were established by Royal
Charter, the first such being granted to Oxford in 1248. These institutions’
governance structures are specified in their Statutes, usually at the time of
foundation via the granting of the charter. For example, Durham University, which
is a Russell Group institution, has Statues that specify that the university ‘shall be
governed by a Visitor, Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Convocation, Council, Senate
and Boards of Studies’ (University of Durham, 2011). Convocation comprises all
members of the university, i.e. the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, Pro Vice
Chancellors, the teaching staff, the heads of colleges and halls of residence, and all
Durham alumni. It meets annually to hear the Vice Chancellor’s Address and
debate any business relating to the university, but can call additional meetings if a
minimum of 50 members so desire. Its powers are limited to appointing the
Chancellor (on the nomination of Council and Senate) and making representations
to the university on any business debated. University Council is the executive body
of the university and has 24 members, maximum: the Chancellor, the Vice
Chancellor, the Deputy Vice Chancellor, up to 12 external lay members, seven
members of the University staff (five of whom are academic staff with research and
teaching responsibilities), the Dean of Durham and the President of the Students’
Union. The Council is the university’s governing and executive body, which has
the authority to review the work of the University and take such steps as necessary
to advance the University’s interests. Council has the power to fix the salaries and
conditions of tenure of posts to which they appoint, and to establish budget centres
within the University for the efficient management of resources. Senate is the
supreme governing body of the university in academic matters. It comprises 7 staff
from the Vice Chancellor’s office, 16 Heads of College, 23 Heads of Department, 3
Student’s Union representatives, 17 members elected by the Academic Electoral
Assembly, 6 co-opted members, the librarian and the head of IT. It nominates the
Vice Chancellor and Pro Vice Chancellors to Council and recommends the
establishment of Faculties and Boards of Studies. Senate grants degrees, but may
also revoke them. Hence, in pre-1992 universities like Durham, the powers of
governance are shared between Convocation, Council and Senate, and their
compositions are such that academic staff have an input into all the decisions that
these bodies make.
By contrast, the post-1992 institutions were established as higher education
corporations by the 1988 Education Reform Act and granted university status by
the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act. Leeds Beckett University is a post-
1992 institution; it has two governance bodies (Leeds Beckett University, undated).
The Board of Governors is the University’s governing body, responsible for
determining the university’s educational character and mission, for overseeing all
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of its activities (including appointing the Vice Chancellor), and for the effective,
efficient and economical use of the University’s funds. The Board has 20 members,
the Vice Chancellor, 12 independent lay governors, 3 co-opted governors (one from
the academic staff), 2 academic board nominees and 2 student representatives. The
Academic Board is the University’s principal academic authority and is responsible
for overseeing and regulating all academic activities, maintaining the academic
standard of awards and enhancing the quality of educational provision. The Board
has a membership of 40: the Vice Chancellor and 8 Deputy and Pro Vice
Chancellors, 13 Deans of Schools, the university’s Secretary, Librarian and
Director of Research, all of whom are ex-officio. The remaining minority are 4
nominated student representatives and 11 elected from among the Professors (2),
research staff (1), academic staff (2), service staff (3) and course directors (3).
It is evident that, in terms of the composition of governance bodies, the input of
academic staff into the decision-making process is noticeably greater in the pre-
1992 universities. However, the extent to which academics elected to governance
bodies may act independently of (or even oppose) university management is
unknown, but in most such elections the University and College Union has a
preferred list of candidates, such that the Union is frequently well represented on
such bodies. Clearly, the presence of elected members on governing bodies in pre-
1992 universities makes more likely greater collegiality in decision-making and
better protection for academic freedom, than exists in the post-1992 universities,
which have decision-making structures that are managerial, rather than collegial.
Nevertheless, irrespective as to whether the institutions are pre- or post-1992
institutions, it is likely that the distribution of administrative authority will favour
what Altbach (1999, 118) describes as the ‘administrative estate’ who have ‘have
little direct relation to the professoriate and do not owe their jobs to them. …- a
self-perpetuating group that is central to the operation of the institution’. However,
the pre-1992 universities are likely to be those described by Shattock (1999, 281) as
‘probably mostly the most academically successful, which have developed a strong
organizational culture that effectively marries academic and managerial structures
to provide both effective decision-making machinery and a strongly self-motivated
academic community. Such a structure is likely to be able to resist the worst aspects
of… managerialism and to be able to preserve a robust academic ethos’.
Additionally, Shattock (2002, 240) found little hard evidence that more manage-
rialist approaches (which appear more evident in post-1992 universities) have been
‘particularly successful in delivering academic success’, and that ‘where impro-
prieties and breakdowns have occurred, they have centred on governing bodies and
the executive and not on the academic community. Indeed, in nearly all such
cases… attention was drawn to the difficulties by concern in the academic
community’. This conclusion is endorsed by Brown’s survey of governance in UK
universities, which found that
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[i]f there is one common feature running through these reports it is the
difficulty which these institutions had in controlling the behaviour of a strong
chief executive who was often closely associated with a small group of key
Governors who may have bypassed a largely supine Governing Body, many
of whom were not sufficiently knowledgeable either about higher education
matters or about their own rights and responsibilities as members of the
supreme decision making body of a higher education institution. (Brown,
2001, 44).
Conclusion
The study has shown that, within the UK context, staff in pre-1992 universities that
occupy the highest positions in the Times Higher’s World University Rankings are
more likely to enjoy greater levels of academic freedom in their teaching and
research and greater participation in university governance, than their counterparts
in post-1992 institutions, suggesting that a change in the governance procedures of
the latter group might be beneficial. Moreover, for national governments (like
China and Finland), seeking invest heavily to create new universities with high
rankings, this research demonstrates that increased funding is unlikely to be cost
effective, unless it is accompanied by governance structures which facilitate
academic freedom and a scholarly ethos conducive to institutional excellence.
Similarly, these results undermine university reforms by national governments
which have increased and centralised managerial control, and diluted involvement
by academics in governance, by replacing them with external members appointed
on the basis of their business acumen, rather than an understanding of higher
education. For example, in Denmark the University Act 2003 replaced elected
university senates with governing boards, of which the majority of members and
the chairman are externally appointed. The Board sets the university’s priorities,
agreeing a development contract with the government, and hiring the Rector to
ensure that the university’s budget is disbursed to achieve their priorities. This
legislation’s impact on research was profound, as Departmental Heads can direct
academic staff to perform certain research activities; thus, individual academics
still have the nominal freedom to conduct scientific research, but their liberty is
circumscribed by the University Board’s research strategic framework, as specified
in the Achievement Contract drawn up with the Ministry. Indeed, Wright (2014,
309) describes how, following the introduction of this new system, Danish
university staff were ‘marked by very high levels of stress. … [a]mong ….
members of the department …. One had collapsed lifeless in the corridor at work,
… Two had experienced the same kind of collapse at home and described how they
suddenly could not function at all – they could not read, mark exam papers, write
reports, or do anything at all’.
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Additionally, this research indicates that ranking organisations like the Times
Higher could usefully consider broadening the range of indicators they use, to
include parameters relating not just to outputs, but managerial processes, such as
governance. The results of this analysis, supported by case study evidence from the
likes of Oxford and Harvard, demonstrate that the teaching and research output
measures used in the calculation of rankings are enabled by, and arise from, the
operation of academic freedom, facilitated by participative governance structures
and processes, within scholarly communities (departments and units). It appears
likely that a virtuous circle operates, whereby academic freedom in universities like
Oxford and Harvard enables the development of ‘world-class’ university profiles
for these institutions, which makes them able to continue to attract both the leading
teachers and researchers in the field and the best qualified students. These scholars
and students, in turn, are imbued with a strong belief in the need for, and benefits
of, academic freedom, and thus pass this ethos down to successive entrants to
academia, thereby perpetuating a high level of scholarly excellence. However, it is
worth noting that institutions like the National University of Singapore and
Tsinghua University in China occupy high positions in the Times Higher Rankings
(22 and 30, respectively) despite the fact that their nations do not protect academic
freedom in law, which suggests that academic freedom may be a necessary
condition for academic excellence, but it is not a sufficient condition. Clearly,
further case study research into such institutions needs to be undertaken to shed
further light on their apparently anomalous situations.
Moreover, in the light of the critical analysis by Birnbaum (2000) of the waste of
resources occasioned by management fads in academia, of some concern is that this
obsession (among national governments and rectors alike) with securing high
rankings within world-class university tables has uneasy parallels with the fixation,
during the dot com boom in the late 1990s, of creating ‘virtual universities’, many
of which devoured huge resources, yet produced little of lasting consequence. For
example, the UK e-university project, which was wound up in 2004, spent £50
million of public money but succeeded in attracting only 900 students (House of
Commons Education and Skills Committee, 2005, 3). It remains to be seen whether
projects attempting to achieve world-class rankings for universities, via more
directive managerial processes (which undermine academic freedom) allied to
considerable financial resources, will follow the same dismal trajectory and waste
public money while simultaneously sacrificing academic freedom, which is
recognised as a core value of higher education and a prerequisite for scientific
endeavour and the advancement of knowledge.
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